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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock 
 
Ignatiev to head Russian Central Bank 
Following a dispute concerning the independence of the Russian Central Bank, 
Victor Gerashchenko abruptly resigned the directorship in mid-March. 
Gerashchenko has been something of an icon in Russian banking circles; he 
managed the nation's finances through the 1998 financial crisis. However, when 
he served as director of the bank during Yel'tsin's first term, he presided over 
much-criticized inflationary policies. For this he was dubbed "the worst central 
banker in history" by Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs. (THE ECONOMIST, 21 
Mar 02) The current dispute involved the proposed linkage of the Central Bank 
with a newly defined National Banking Council to be composed of 
representatives from the legislative and executive branches. President Putin is 
reported to have given the word that Gerashchenko's term would not be 
renewed, sparking the resignation. (VEDOMOSTI, 18 Mar 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) 
 
Gerashchenko's replacement is Sergei Ignatiev, whom he once fired. So far 
Ignatiev has shown no sign that he will radically alter Gerashchenko's financial 
course, although the media have been pessimistic that any Russian liberal could 
manage the banking system responsibly. The real reason behind Ignatiev's 
appointment may not be his actual banking skills at all. He is reputed to be an 
effective and reliable administrator, not someone to shake the boat, and, most 
importantly, a man without a personality as outgoing and impressive as 
Gerashchenko's. With this appointment Putin may not gain direct control of the 
Russian Central Bank, but he does get rid of a potentially active opponent there. 
(VERSTY, 21 Mar 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Ignatiev has yet to 
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announce a specific stance toward the creation of the National Banking Council. 
Should such a measure be passed, the Russian Central Bank would face the 
danger of becoming a highly politicized organization.  
 
Ignatiev has supported the right of the oligarchs to channel their money out of 
Russia and into the foreign currency market, which Gerashchenko had long 
fought. (MOSKOVKSY KOMSOMOLETS, 18 Mar 02; via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
As opposed to most members of Putin's government, Ignatiev was not connected 
to the St. Petersburg group. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 19 Mar 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) Rather, he has been linked more closely with the 
coterie of Anatoly Chubais, although it is doubtful that this appointment 
constitutes a substantial victory for that group. (ZAVTRA, 21 Mar 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) More than likely Ignatiev represents someone who 
can be manipulated by the Kremlin. As deputy finance minister, he had all the 
right credentials at the right time. 
 
It is interesting to note the timing of this change with respect to the upcoming 
Duma elections. Gerashchenko had been replaced temporarily by another 
"liberal" head of the Central Bank only one year before the 1995 parliamentary 
elections. His current replacement was made only 18 months before the 
upcoming Duma elections. In the words of one Russian newspaper, "A 
convenient cashier, somebody who will not object to looking the other way when 
told to do so, is needed." (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 21 Mar 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) This rather conspiratorial view emphasizes the 
need for Putin's camp to find a source of funding independent of the less 
submissive oligarchs, who may have strings attached to their campaign 
financing. 
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Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
New level of cooperation between FSB and Western agencies? 
Immediately following the 11 September 2001 attacks on America, the Bush 
administration determined that cooperation with Russia was desirable on a 
variety of levels, if the "war on terrorism" was to be successfully prosecuted. 
Russia was willing to play along for several reasons, not least because Moscow 
is concerned about a potential spread of Islamic fundamentalism from 
Afghanistan into Central Asia (a region Moscow claims to be in its "sphere of 
influence"), and because President Vladimir Putin has long alleged that there are 
links between Osama bin Laden, the Taliban and Chechen separatists fighting 
the Russian Army. 
 
The primary agencies involved in Russian contacts with the US were the foreign 
intelligence (SVR) and the FSB, which were, according to various reports, 
instrumental in reversing Russia's original opposition to the use of covert 
airbases in Tajikistan. (Stephen J. Blank, STRATEGIC ISSUE ANALYSIS, 
RUSSIA AND THE US WAR ON TERRORISM, 15 Jan 02) 
 
In the last week, it has become evident that these contacts have involved not 
only the FSB and US intelligence agencies on a bilateral basis, but rather 
between a large number of states on a multilateral basis. Between 25 and 27 
March FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev hosted a meeting at the Tavrichesky 
Palace in St. Petersburg that was attended by representatives of 39 intelligence 
and police agencies, including Britain's MI5 and MI6, and Germany's Federal 
Intelligence Service (BND). 
 
Victor Ivanov, deputy head of the presidential administration, opened the forum 
with a message from President Putin: "No state, no matter how big its military or 
economic potential is, can effectively fight alone against a broad network of terror 
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organizations." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 25 Mar 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) 
 
Although, due to the sensitive subject matter, the meeting was held behind 
closed doors, Patrushev subsequently spoke to the press and claimed that 
international intelligence cooperation had reached unprecedented levels. 
Patrushev stated that bilateral and multilateral interagency cooperation already 
had produced "tangible results." He added that, despite their conflicts of interest 
in many other areas, "We special services trust each other in the fight against 
terrorism, drugs and arms trafficking." (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 26 Mar 02; 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) As a result of the conference a permanent 
working group is to be established, and the intelligence chiefs are to meet on an 
annual basis.  
 
At the same time, two further official discussions about terrorism took place. 
Representatives of the CIS countries and the standing Commission of the 
Permanent Assembly of The Council of Europe (PACE) also met in St. 
Petersburg. PACE General Secretary Peter Scheider and Sergei Mironov, 
chairman of the CIS Inter-parliamentary Council, issued a joint statement 
declaring their intent to work together against international terrorism. 
 
Although a thawing of old Cold War attitudes -- particularly between security 
services -- is welcome, it should not be exaggerated. For instance, just last week 
the Russian Embassy in Washington DC served a summons to the former KGB 
officer Gen. Oleg Kalugin. A similar summons was issued to Alexandr Litvinenko, 
an FSB agent who also came over the West. Clearly, cooperation has fairly 
circumscribed limits. It should be remembered that Russia is pursuing its own 
agenda, particularly with regard to NATO expansion, Iran and Iraq, as well as 
concerning the conflict in Chechnya. Putin's goal is to ensure that Russia retains 
influence over matters that are deemed important to national security. It seems 
that the chosen conduit for that influence is to be the security apparatus. 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
A loss for the communists... 
On 20 March State Duma deputies voted 245 to 159, with 2 abstentions, to 
deprive State Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznev of his casting vote (in case of a 
parliamentary tie). Seleznev protested that this vote is his constitutional right, 
noted that he has only used this power a few times, and asserted that the move 
against him was a political rather than a technical issue. The Duma vote actually 
was a prelude to the motion to review the question of removing Seleznev, a 
member of the Communist Party, from his speakership. The ousting process was 
initiated by deputies from the Union of Right Forces (Boris Nadezhdin), Unity 
(Vladimir Pekhtin), and Fatherland - All Russia (Farida Gainullina); the motion to 
review was approved by a vote of 247 to 127. (NTVRU, 20 Mar 02; via 
www.ntvru.com) 
 
...is a victory for United Russia... 
YABLOKO's deputy chairman Sergei Ivanenko spoke in favor of replacing the 
speaker and suggested that a representative of the majority party (United Russia 
-- the amalgamation of Unity, Fatherland-All Russia, People's Deputy, and 
Regions of Russia) would improve the Duma's productivity. Oleg Morozov, the 
leader of the Regions of Russia group of deputies and a member of the General 
Council of United Russia, announced that he would be ready to take up the 
position of chairman if United Russia wished. Liberal Democratic Party of Russia 
Chairman Vladimir Zhirinovsky additionally demanded that the frequency of the 
Duma speaker's trips abroad should be grounds for his ouster (Seleznev had, at 
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the time, just left for a visit to Spain) and recommended himself as a 
replacement. (NTVRU, 21 Mar 02; via www.ntvru.com; and IZVESTIYA, 16 Mar 
02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0319, via World News Connection) 
 
However, according to a source in the presidential administration, Gennady 
Seleznev is likely to keep his position because the Kremlin does not support the 
move against him. (LENTA, 29 Mar 02; via www. lenta.ru) Yet another source 
suggests that the Duma's chief of staff, Nikolai Troshkin, who previously was 
accused of conducting intrigues that benefited the communists at the expense of 
the other parties, will be fired to satisfy the deputies. (NTVRU, 28 Mar 02; via 
www.ntvru.com) Finally, rumors have been floated that Seleznev might give up 
his membership in the Communist Party to save his position. Seleznev has 
denied this. (INTERFAX, 0630 GMT, 24 Mar 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0324, via 
World News Connection)  
 
...and for the State Duma's popularity 
If the "efficiency" and central orientation of the State Duma is increased, public 
support is likely to grow. According to opinion polls held by the independent 
center for Russian Public Opinion and Market Research (ROMIR), the approval 
rating for the lower house of the Russian parliament rose from 23.8 percent to 
30.7 percent between April 2001 and February 2002. The percentage of those 
who say they disapprove of the Duma's performance dropped from 68.1 percent 
to 50.9 percent. (ITAR-TASS, 1330 GMT, 11 Mar 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0311, via 
World News Connection) Still, hardly a resounding vote of confidence. 
 
MEDIA 
Kiselev's team wins the bid for the TV-6 frequency... 
Media-Socium, a non-profit partnership established by the journalist and director 
of the ousted TV-6 team, Yevgeny Kiselev, Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Chairman Yevgeny Primakov, Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs 
Chairman Arkady Volsky, and a number of leading businessmen -- including 
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Oleg Kiselev, Anatoly Chubais, Roman Abramovich, Kakha Bendukidze, Andrei 
Melnichenko, Alexander Mamut, Oleg Deripaska and Vladimir Yevtushenkov -- 
won the tender for the Channel 6 frequency on 27 March. They may begin 
broadcasts as early as at the end of the month, although the media ministry 
contacted NTV-Sport, the temporary frequency holder, to make sure it could 
continue its programming until the fall of this year. 
 
Kiselev told reporters that his company is currently working "on changing the old 
or creating completely new" program formats and deciding on the channel's new 
name. (ITAR-TASS, 1611 GMT, 28 Mar 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0328, via World 
News Connection; and NTVRU, 26 Mar 02; via www.ntvru.com) In response to 
accusations that the Kremlin has approved the selection of Media-Socium with 
an eye to controlling the information through Primakov and Volsky, Kiselev 
replied: "The constitution outlaws censorship in this country, and let us not call for 
breaking laws when touching upon the subject. The story of Primakov, Volsky 
and the Kremlin is a scary tale for nervous women who read gossip papers. It is 
nothing but idle talk." (INTERFAX, 0921 GMT, 28 Mar 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0328, 
via World News Connection) 
 
The tender was observed by several State Duma deputies, but Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia Chairman Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who organized a 
protest in front of the press ministry building, declared that this did not guarantee 
the fairness of the process. Zhirinovsky, who also had submitted a bid, asserted 
that a decision had been made ahead of time. (NTVRU, 27 Mar 02; via 
www.ntvru.com) 
 
...but the victory may be for naught because of an appeal by... Kiselev 
According to the latest reports, however, the decision favoring Media-Socium 
may be invalidated if the appeal filed by the previous organization of TV-6 
journalists, headed by Kiselev to protest the liquidation of TV-6, is approved. In 
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that case, Media Minister Mikhail Lesin reports, the whole process will be started 
from scratch. (LENTA, 1 Apr 02; via www. lenta.ru) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Bethel 
 
Who's in charge? 
Throughout the Middle Eastern crisis so far, the Russians have called on both 
sides regularly to cease violence and to work toward a peaceful settlement to the 
conflict. However, below the surface, Moscow clearly has favored the 
Palestinians. There are two key reasons for Russia's support of Arafat. First, 
Russia still seeks to be a world power and a viable alternative to US 
"domination." Supporting the Arabs is viewed as being in opposition to the United 
States (though the firmness of US support for Israel is debatable). (See THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 27 Feb 02) Second, Russia (and the Soviet Union before it) has 
maintained long-standing relationships with such "rogue states" as Iraq, Syria 
and Iran. This is true in terms of diplomatic support and significant sales of 
military hardware. However, the escalation of Palestinian suicide bombing and 
the apparent unwillingness of Chairman Yassir Arafat to agree to and enforce a 
cease-fire have put the Russians in an increasingly uncomfortable position. 
 
On 11 March, the Palestinian Authority (PA), backed by the Arab League, 
appealed to Russia to become the principal advocate to defend Palestinian 
rights. (ITAR-TASS, 1721 GMT, 11 Mar 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) This appeal overtly placed the entire blame for the situation 
on the shoulders of the Israelis, claiming: "Russia should take upon itself the 
responsibility for protecting the Palestinian citizens against Israeli barbarity." 
(ITAR-TASS, 1721 GMT, 11 Mar 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) The communiqué went on to highlight Israel's use of modern 
 9 
weaponry including tanks and helicopters against the Palestinians and alleged 
that the Israelis were targeting the hurt and sick. 
 
On the same day, Foreign Minister Ivanov met with the foreign ministers of Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar. Again, the Arabs requested that Russia take on the 
role of the principal protector of the Palestinian people and force the Israelis to 
stop "any and all aggression against Arabs." (ITAR-TASS, 1731 GMT, 11 Mar 
02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Ivanov responded with 
a restatement of the long-standing Russian stance: "Russia's position is 
unchanged, violence must stop on both sides." (RIA, 2000 GMT, 11 Mar 02; BBC 
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Also on the same day, the speaker of the Russian Federation Council, Sergey 
Mironov, swung the pendulum toward the Israeli position. Most importantly, he 
snubbed the Palestinian Authority by refusing to meet with Arafat as planned for 
12 March. He said this was his personal decision. "[W]hen pondering the origin of 
the terrorist acts in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Israel, I have concluded they 
have the same roots, financial above all. In this situation I am not prepared to 
make a polite gesture [toward Arafat]." (ITAR-TASS, 1920 GMT, 11 Mar 02; BBC 
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Later, in the presence of Israeli 
parliament speaker Avraham Burg, he paid tribute to the "Israeli victims of 
Palestinian violence." (ITAR-TASS, 2016 GMT, 11 Mar 02; BBC Monitoring, via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
President Putin was noncommittal. On 11 March, he praised the "support of 
Russian Jews" both in the current crisis and "through the years." (EKHO 
MOSKVY, 1025 GMT, 11 Mar 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) Two days later he joined the European Community in pressuring the 
Israelis to withdraw their forces from Ramallah and expressed support when they 
did so on 15 March. (ITAR-TASS, 1029 GMT, 15 Mar 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) He also has made several statements encouraging 
 10 
the two sides to meet, discuss and sustain a workable cease-fire. But, the 
president has been cautious in his support for the PA, compared with previous 
Russian policies. 
 
The Russians face a dilemma. Should Moscow step back from strong support of 
the Palestinian side, it stands to lose position among the Arab countries. 
However, as noted by the speaker, it is clear that much of the current violence 
has been fueled by ongoing suicide attacks by Palestinian radicals, which the 
Russians cannot ignore. Nor can they ignore the fact that funding for international 
terrorism comes through the Palestinian Authority. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 21 
Feb 02) Therefore, Russia is likely to continue being cautious, condemning 
violence against and by both Israelis and Palestinians while encouraging 
increased dialogue. However, it is unlikely that the Russians will take a more 
active role until there is an opening for them to intrude. 
 
Still, it is not a sign of a healthy external relations apparatus to have several 
individuals espousing different approaches. To this end Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov said during the government hour in the State Duma, "It is quite obvious 
that (members of) the State Duma are interested in playing a role in international 
affairs It is also quite obvious that a state willing to play a key role in the 
international arena should speak with one voice." (RIA, 0324 GMT, 15 Mar 02; 
BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) In a later interview, he 
explained the position of President Putin on these issues: "Russian President 
Vladimir Putin recently issued instructions to the Foreign Ministry to intensify the 
coordination of activities. The Foreign Ministry should be responsible for 
everything that happens in Foreign Policy." (ITAR-TASS, 1109 GMT, 16 Mar 02; 
BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Foreign minister answers myriad of questions on call-in show 
On 15 March, Foreign Minister Ivanov answered questions submitted by listeners 
for more than an hour on a Moscow radio show. No subject was too controversial 
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for this show. First, he confirmed that a recent blackout of Russian TV in Ukraine 
was a technical malfunction, not a political decision. (EKHO MOSKVY, 1025 
GMT, 16 Mar 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) He also 
took time to chastise the US. "[The US] withdrawal from the [ABM] treaty was not 
just directed at Russia as many believe. It was directed against the international 
community." Ivanov also confirmed the Russian position that the presence of US 
forces in Central Asia presented no threat to Moscow. He explained that Russia 
was committed to the war on terrorism and would stand with "the rest of the free 
world to stop this activity at its root." 
 
New Afghan leader visits Moscow 
The head of the Afghan interim administration, Hamid Karzai, visited Moscow 
from 11 to 13 March to discuss ways in which the Russians could assist in the 
rebuilding of his country. Top on his list of priorities for discussion was the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan. He also was interested in more military 
cooperation with his large neighbor to the north and increased trade.  
 
Karzai's trip followed several weeks of buildup by the Moscow media. A great 
deal of history colors views of the future, although it seems there is a general 
feeling that, with the new Afghan regime, relations could be improved. Clearly 
Karzai is more interested in reconciliation than bravado. "Afghanistan has long 
depended on good relations with Russian leadership, now our people need a 
friend more than ever," he said. (ITAR-TASS, 1624 GMT, 12 Mar 02; BBC 
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The Russian leadership clearly reciprocates the desire for positive neighborly 
relations. "Russia has always supported Afghanistan's legitimate government 
and is now ready to render sufficient support in restoring the country's economy 
and settling urgent humanitarian and social problems," President Putin said. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1313 GMT, 16 Mar 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) However, it is unclear what the "sufficient support" would entail. 
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Karzai also met with leaders of both houses of the Duma and other senior 
Russian officials during his three-day visit. The Afghan leader discussed 
increased border security and his country's willingness to increase efforts to stem 
the drug trade. (RIA, 0907 GMT, 11 Mar 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) Karzai was warmly received; he promised "drastic measures" 
against drug trafficking. (ITAR-TASS, 1518 GMT, 13 Mar 02; BBC Monitoring, via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Still, while the Russian leadership is embracing Karzai on these initial visits, 
privately, it appears, there is much skepticism among Moscow's elite about his 
long-term prospects for maintaining power. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 5 Mar 02) 
For the short run at least, Russia will continue to do what it can to help 
Afghanistan both for the international benefits associated with being part of the 
regional solution and to ensure a position of influence in post-war Afghanistan. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces and Military-
Industrial Complex 
By Walter Jackson 
 
Right on the mark! 
According to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, the road to building a 
professional military has to start with correcting existing social problems that 
plague all the Russian military services. "The general condition of the Armed 
Forces of Russia is rather bad," Ivanov admitted during a recent visit to the 
Leningrad military district. Ivanov stated that the military has lost "social and 
psychological prestige" over the last decade, and that "a military man should 
earn 25 to 30% more than a civilian." (VREMYA NOVOSTI, 11 Mar 02; What the 
Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) 
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Despite repeated criticism from the military and Kremlin hard-liners, Ivanov is 
clearly on the right road to true military reform, justifying President Putin's 
decision to place a "civilian" without preexisting (and inculcated Soviet) military 
bias in charge of the defense ministry. Of course, Ivanov had served for a 
decade in the KGB. Hence continued tensions between "civilian" leadership and 
the generals can be expected. The existing military leaders continue to hold fast 
to the Soviet-era principle of the bigger the better, and to explain poor readiness 
and morale as the results of poor quality recruits, rather than inadequate 
leadership.  
 
In the meantime, President Putin has issued a decree raising military officers' pay 
to the level of their official state counterparts. Although the decree does not 
specify a ruble amount to the officers' salaries, it does direct the Cabinet to raise 
those salaries to the appropriate level, prior to 1 July when military housing 
compensation and other "perks" are abolished. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 8 
Mar 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) The 
defense ministry has prepared a table equating military and civil ranks and 
positions. Beginning with the lowest ranks, a private, will be equal to an adviser 
of the state service of the third class for pay purposes. (NOVYE IZVESTIA, 13 
Mar 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) However, 
historically, a Russian presidential decree has not meant necessarily that the 
money would be there, and there is no reason to assume that this year things will 
be different. The 2002 budget is under close scrutiny. 
 
No news must be good news or maybe not 
Every since the January inflationary figures surfaced, the finance ministry has 
been tight-lipped about the implementation (or perhaps even the validity) of the 
2002 defense budget. According to Russian economist Alexei Vorobiov, "This 
[silence] is very disappointing. I admit that this year the budget revenues are not 
so high as before [2001], but poor figures are not such bad news as the refusal of 
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the ministry to publish them." (VEDOMOSTI, 13 Mar 02; What the Papers Say, 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Of course, with President Putin's decree on 
military pay parity with civil servants, and his stated plan to build a professional 
military, budget difficulties could constitute an insurmountable obstacle. It 
appears evident though that President Putin is determined to find a way to carry 
out his plans, budget notwithstanding. But bad news never gets better with age. It 
only makes one wonder how bad things really are. 
 
Funding aside, where to start? 
The General Staff had a 15 March deadline to submit reform recommendations -- 
specifically a step-by-step plan to create a professional military -- to Prime 
Minister Mikhail Kasianov. Are the General Staff's recommendations substantive 
reforms or merely a superficial alignment with the civil service pay scales? 
 
According to Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, the 76th Airborne Division in Pskov 
will serve as the test case for creating the first totally professional (non-conscript) 
military unit. Ivanov stated that the "experiment" will begin in the fall of 2002 and 
"by mid-2003 the military will be able to calculate how much money will be 
needed to maintain each division of non-conscript personnel." General 
Vyacheslav Putilin, head of the Chief Organization-Mobilization Department 
(GOMU), estimates that the 76th Airborne Division (with a preexisting level of 
15% contract personnel) could require as much as 1 billion rubles to transform it 
totally. (VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 8 Mar 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense 
and Security Database) 
 
One cost estimate of the military transformation, according to Maj-Gen Valeriy 
Astanin, head of the GOMU Manning Department, is significant. Astanin 
estimates that "full transition of the armed forces to contract service will require at 
least doubling the [Russian] military budget. The calculations have been made 
without taking into account the funds required to purchase armaments and 
military hardware, and to conduct research and development work." (ITAR-TASS, 
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1013 GMT, 27 Feb 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0227, via World News Connection) It 
appears as though realistic figures are beginning to surface. The challenge will 
be generating revenue to pay for these programs given the current economic 
conditions in Russia. 
 
Launching one division to determine actual costs might not seem like a 
sufficiently scientific approach to calculating the defense budget. Yet it might 
prove to be the most accurate way, given the difficulties facing the defense and 
finance ministries as they try to develop a realistic budget, manage inflation and 
pay the bills. Moreover, the elite 76th Airborne Division is a good place to start 
building the professional military. Some critics say that the General Staff already 
tried this experiment with the 201st motorized division in Tajikistan, without any 
positive results (NOVYE IZVESTIA, 13 Mar 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database); however, they overlook the fact that most of the 
money never made it into the hands of the troops. For reform to work, timely and 
efficient payment is needed. 
 
The model of military reform 
Last year President Putin signed the Program of Construction of the Armed 
Forces of the Russian Federation between 2001 and 2005. The reforms 
envisaged deal with reduction in size and the reorganization of the military 
infrastructure. Putin's ambitious timeline forces the military leadership to act now 
despite the generals' clear preference for a much more gradual approach. 
President Putin correctly views the relative "time of peace" in Russia as optimal 
to make drastic reforms cutting infrastructure and improving combat readiness. 
He also realizes, apparently, that he must have a well-paid and professionally 
competent force. 
 
Some generals have characterized the military reforms as the "establishment of a 
small combat-ready army with the ability of fast mobilization," in other words, 
modeled after the 76th Airborne Division. What is the shape of the airborne 
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forces today? According to Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Georgy Shpak, 
"The Airborne Troops are thoroughly under-equipped with armored vehicles, 
reconnaissance means, engineering equipment, and communications means. 
The level is below that specified by the guiding documents and varies between 
80% and 90%." (VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 13 Mar 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI 
Defense and Security Database) However, even the 80% to 90% combat 
readiness figures include substantially outdated and obsolete equipment, giving 
an inflated measure of readiness. 
 
Patching potholes 
The troops are not the only portion of the military experiencing readiness 
problems. According to Russian Deputy Defense Minister General Aleksandr 
Kosovan, all 70 Russian military airfields need renovation, and over 60 percent of 
them have obsolete infrastructure. At current funding levels the defense ministry 
is able to renovate only one airfield per year. Last year the Chkalovsky airfield 
near Moscow got a new runway; this year the Kubinka airfield, also near 
Moscow, begins renovation. (ITAR-TASS, 2050 GMT, 27 Feb 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-0227, via World News Connection) This constitutes yet another example of 
the how insufficient the defense budget is, and how much is really needed to 
maintain existing infrastructure. One solution might be the creation of a Base 
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) program modeled after the US program, in 
which a determination is made as to which bases are really needed, and the rest 
are closed. Funds saved through base closures would allow for accelerated 
improvements to the remaining bases. 
 
2nd Army's spring exercise 
Following the September terrorist attacks President Putin created the 2nd Army 
from the merger of the Trans-Volga and Ural military districts to strengthen the 
Russian southern defense sector. The command-staff exercise, from 11 to 18 
March, was designed to test the 2nd Army's combat effectiveness in two phases. 
The first phase consisted of a joint multinational force exercise with Collective 
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Security Treaty members Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan. The second phase featured a Russian-only exercise on Russian soil. 
The "unnamed" enemy's simulated "attack" came "from the Central Asian 
sector." The exercise, including over 4,000 servicemen and 500 pieces of military 
hardware, was conducted on the territory of the Samara, Orenburg and Saratov 
regions, and the Republic of Bashkortostan. Reserve units of the 2nd Army and 
other security services (including the interior and railroad services, border guards 
and emergency ministry forces) participated as well. (VREMYA NOVOSTEI, 15 
Mar 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) Politically 
this is an important exercise for President Putin, meant to: demonstrate solidarity 
with Collective Security Treaty members; project (at least the appearance of) a 
positive image of the military; and serve to quell the fears of the Russian 
population that the military cannot provide protection from Islamic fundamentalist 
threats from the south. 
 
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 
Significant industry reforms in the shadows? 
Although there is much written about reforming the Russian military, plans for the 
military-industrial complex don't seem to have drawn as much attention. This is 
not too surprising with arms exports reaching all-time highs and sales 
significantly contributing to the government's revenues. However, arms export 
revenues are a result of Third World demand for older technologies and cheap 
(current) production costs. Although reforms have been discussed for over a 
decade, export demands generating revenues have pushed off serious 
discussions until recently. With rising production costs, though, today's 
competitive pricing soon may be undercut. Demand for newer technologies must 
be accounted for within the industry, and that involves substantial investment in 
research and development and rubles currently are in short supply. (ROSSIISKIE 
VESTI, 15 Mar 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
Unpaid utility bills and wage arrears are rampant throughout most of the industry, 
so profitability in the Russian arms industry may be overstated. To survive on the 
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world market, the Russian defense industry will have to concentrate on industry 
(plant) modernization, technological innovation and cost cutting. 
 
Mergers 
Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Center of Analysis of Strategies and 
Technologies, said that cardinal cuts in the military-industrial complex are 
inevitable, and that Russia's existing military-industrial complex (created during 
Soviet times) is too unwieldy. There are currently over 1,700 defense industry 
plants throughout Russia and many are not operating efficiently. The total 
number could be pared down to as few as 600. 
 
"To date almost all defense plants duplicate each other: Uralvagonzavod (Nizhny 
Tagil) and Transmash (Omsk) in the tank industry, the Irkutsk aircraft plant and 
the Komsomolsk-on-Amur aircraft plant in the aircraft industry, and the Baltic 
Plant and Severnaya Verf in the shipbuilding sector. No one knows which of 
these plants will remain," one source in the Ministry for Industry and Science 
said. Wartime surge capabilities also will enter into the final decision-making 
process. (VEDOMOSTI, 15 Mar 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and 
Security Database) Competition's pros usually outweigh the cons. But a 
significant overhaul of Russia's military-industrial complex is necessary to 
improve efficiency and maintain profitability. With the Russian economy faltering, 
there are indications that prompt decisions already are being made to determine 
which industries will merge. 
 
Attrition actually may pare down the number of defense industry plants even 
sooner. Igor Prostyakov, the first deputy presidential envoy to the Siberian 
Federal District, said recently that not one of the 33 defense enterprises in 
Novosibirsk Oblast' received a single kopek in payment from the government for 
defense orders so far this year (during January and February). He also stated 
that many of the defense industries in the Siberian districts might have to declare 
bankruptcy. (INTERFAX-EURASIA, 15 Mar 02; via RFE/RL Newsline) One way 
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or another, it appears that significant changes are forthcoming in the defense 
industry. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Seeing the glass as half-full 
On 31 March, Ukrainians went to the polls in what was probably the most 
contentious parliamentary election in the country's short 11-year history. Long 
before the campaign began, it was clear that the government in power would use 
every possible administrative resource to try to maintain control of the chamber. 
It also was clear that, for the first time, an authentic opposition movement existed 
in the country, and this movement had a chance to alter significantly the power 
structure of the parliament. The election battle was dirty -- and often illegal. In the 
end, however, Ukraine elected a parliament that could turn out to be more 
reform-oriented than any in recent years and possibly more capable than ever. If 
the divided body can avoid becoming deadlocked on important issues, it could 
move forward on reforms necessary in a number of areas. 
 
Examining the poll results, the possibility of legislative deadlock is of most 
concern, given the inability of any bloc to win a majority. In fact, the two largest 
blocs have landed in a virtual dead heat -- at least on paper. When the vote 
counting was completed, Viktor Yushchenko's opposition Our Ukraine bloc had 
won 70 seats from party lists and 42 in single mandate constituencies. President 
Leonid Kuchma's For a United Ukraine bloc garnered 34 party list seats and 68 
from single-mandate areas. Additionally, two parties that won three and four 
single-mandate seats, respectively -- Unity and the Democratic Bloc - already 
have pledged to join For a United Ukraine. Consequently, Our Ukraine and For a 
United Ukraine control 112 and 109 seats, respectively.  
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However, the anti-Kuchma bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BUT) won 21 seats, while 
the also largely anti-Kuchma Socialist Party gained 24. These 45 votes likely will 
support Yushchenko's positions often. Meanwhile, the former "party of power," 
the Social-Democrat Party-united, managed 23 seats, despite pressure applied 
against it by some of Kuchma's allies. Those seats will be important swing votes, 
as will the 66 seats controlled by the Communist Party and the 95 votes held by 
independent members of parliament, where Kuchma is seen to have an 
advantage. (For detailed results, see the Brama RCC POLITICAL REVIEW; via 
www.brama.com/rcc) 
 
Despite the diverse numbers, there can be little doubt that Ukraine's parliament is 
not nearly the parliament Leonid Kuchma desired when this election campaign 
began, and that is an important achievement by the opposition. Kuchma badly 
wanted to beat Viktor Yushchenko, and even more badly wanted to see Yulia 
Tymoshenko removed. Neither of these events occurred. The president also 
clearly hoped for a majority to help him move easily either into a third term or 
retirement. Now, a third term seems impossible and there may be little offered in 
the way of immunity once he is out of office. On the other hand, the two Rukhs -- 
the most important reformist, "nationalist" parties -- were given new, more 
powerful life in the Our Ukraine bloc. And another of its components, the Reforms 
and Order party, championed by Myroslava Gongadze (not one of Kuchma's 
favorite persons), also made great gains. Although the possibility of real reform is 
just that -- a possibility -- it is one that did not exist just a few days ago. 
 
Of course, this mixed result may seem disappointing for an opposition that 
dreamt of majority rule, but in an environment of intimidation and repression, it is 
impressive. It also should be somewhat of a relief to international organizations 
that worried about a major escalation of government intimidation -- including 
more violence -- on election day in an attempt to maintain control. Intimidation 
and manipulation certainly occurred, but despite this, reformers made significant 
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advances, proving that Ukraine continues to shuffle ahead on the path to 
democracy. This was by no means certain when the campaign began, and 
international organizations can take a good deal of credit for their work to assist 
Ukraine down that path during this election. 
 
In the weeks leading up to the poll, organizations throughout the world weighed 
in on the campaign. There were resolutions, press releases, reports and official 
statements -- all designed to remind President Kuchma and his allies that the 
world was watching. On 4 March, for example, the National Democratic Institute 
for International Affairs (NDI) released its detailed Pre-Election Report. "The 
stakes in the March 2002 Rada [parliament] elections are high," it reads. "[The 
elections] will determine the composition of the next Ukrainian legislature, which 
has the potential to become a platform for reform. The next parliament has the 
opportunity to advance legislation to, among other things, revise the tax code, 
improve the land code,... improve the court system, and establish an 
unambiguous separation of powers between the executive, legislature and 
judiciary." The report took note of numerous violations in the campaign up to that 
point (for details, see THE NIS OBSERVED, 27 Feb 02), and suggested that "the 
pre-election environment and the application of the law has raised concerns 
about the conduct, thus far, of the elections." (THE MARCH 31, 2002 
PARLIAMENTARY AND LOCAL ELECTIONS IN UKRAINE: A PRE-ELECTION 
REPORT, NDI, 4 Mar 02) 
 
Meanwhile, in its Interim Report No. 1, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(OSCE/ODIHR) noted, "Recurrent complaints and allegations relate to the 
advantages of incumbency and the failure of the State administration at all levels 
to create equal conditions for all election contestants." The report also discussed 
"intimidation and undue pressure directed at opposition party activists, voters and 
candidates." (OSCE/ODIHR INTERIM REPORT NO. 1, 26 Feb-11 Mar 02) 
Additionally, the European Union, as well as representatives from individual 
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countries, traveled to Ukraine to assess and, most importantly, to publicize the 
situation. 
 
All of this activity eventually led to resolutions in both the US House and US 
Senate urging, among other things, "the Government of Ukraine to meet its 
commitments on democratic elections" under its agreement with the OSCE and 
to "enforce impartially its newly adopted election law." In House Congressional 
floor debate, representatives called attention to the still-unresolved murder of 
journalist Georgiy Gongadze, and reminded the country of the level of US aid 
provided to it in the past. (HOUSE RESOLUTION 339, 20 Mar 02) 
 
This US activity received an inordinate amount of attention in Ukraine, as 
Kuchma, his allies and Russian representatives all railed against US 
"interference" in Ukrainian affairs. Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), co-chair of 
the US Congressional Helsinki Commission and a co-sponsor of the House 
resolution, responded quickly to the criticism. His words should come as music to 
the ears of those in Ukraine who bemoan the lack of attention sometimes paid to 
their country. "It is important to underscore the reason for this congressional 
interest in Ukraine," he said. "The clear and simple reason: an independent, 
democratic, and economically stable Ukraine is vital to the stability and security 
of Europe, and we want to encourage Ukraine in realizing its own oft-stated goal 
of integration into Europe." (HELSINKI COMMISSION PRESS RELEASE, 21 
Mar 02) 
 
Ukrainians seemed to make progress during this campaign toward understanding 
their own responsibility for attaining this goal. There was an explosion of attention 
to the election by local, private polling companies, information/communications 
firms, and all-Ukrainian not-for-profit monitoring agencies. All of these 
organizations worked tirelessly to challenge the obstacles put in their way by 
Kuchma's henchmen (and women). This bodes well for the future of Ukrainian 
civil society. It is true that the majority of Ukrainians remain disillusioned, but a 
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certain segment of society came into its own during this campaign. This can be 
nothing but positive. 
 
It certainly was a positive development for this election. The local work by 
Ukrainian organizations, combined with massive international attention and 
pressure, as well as the over 1,000 international observers who arrived in 
Ukraine to monitor the election, enabled the opposition to make significant -- if 
limited -- progress. 
 
It is true that there were numerous violations before, during and after the casting 
of the votes. The OSCE International Election Observer Mission recognized 
these violations in its Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions. Its 
observers, the organization said, found "shortcomings which contributed to a 
general atmosphere of distrust and a low level of public confidence in the election 
process. These shortcomings included abuse of administrative resources, 
interference by local authorities, shortcomings in the implementation of the new 
election legislation, and a campaign marred by the murder of two candidates and 
other isolated cases of violence as well as allegations of intimidation and 
harassment against opposition candidates, activists and voters." They also noted 
progress, but declined immediately to make a final determination as to whether 
the election met international standards. That finding "will depend on the role of 
the election administration and the judiciary in the post-election phase," the 
statement reads. (OSCE NEWS RELEASE, 1 Apr 02) In other words, the 
organization will wait until promised legal challenges in certain districts by Our 
Ukraine, Tymoshenko and the Socialist Party are heard. 
 
Nevertheless, in the end, even with all of its administrative resources and 
pressure tactics, Kuchma's bloc merely survived. It did not win. Maybe, in a 
country that is only 11 years old, with a dearth of experienced leadership and 
decades of totalitarian control, this is all that truly can be expected. Naturally, 
much more can be desired. It is, after all, distressing that a country with so much 
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potential must struggle so fiercely against its learned totalitarian tendencies. But 
the parliamentary elections of 2002 should not be seen as a defeat. They were 
simply a step -- one of many to come -- in the right direction. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
GEORGIA 
Russia preparing to invade Georgia? 
Georgian Defense Minister David Tevzadze called a press conference on 26 
March to warn that Russia is planning a provocation against Georgia in Abkhazia 
in order to delay the arrival of US special forces. (GEORGIAN TELEVISION, 26 
Mar 02; BBC, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Tevzadze emphasized that 
Georgia is not interested in any escalation of tensions in Abkhazia. 
 
Indeed, Kommersant reported on 27 March that units of the Russian 58th Army 
stationed in the districts adjoining Abkhazia and South Ossetia "have been 
placed in a state of heightened combat readiness." (BBC; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) However, sources at the General Staff explained that the 
purpose of the alert was to secure the border -- and was not related to the 
tensions surrounding Abkhazia and Pankisi. 
 
Are the Americans coming? 
The US State Department's deputy spokesman, Philip Reeker, emphasized that 
President George W. Bush "has made quite clear that he remains committed to 
conducting this train-and-equip program in Georgia, and the preparation needed 
to move forward is on track." Reeker noted that "Russia's 1999 Istanbul summit 
commitments on withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia are completely 
separate from the US train-and-equip program." (www.state.gov) Reeker called 
on Russia to negotiate with Georgia and fulfill its promises to withdraw the 
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remaining military bases from Georgian territory. Despite assurances that US 
plans for the missions continue, no date has been announced. However, as 
previously reported, US troops already are training Georgian helicopter pilots in 
the vicinity of the Pankisi Gorge. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 13 Mar 02) 
 
Reeker's comments came in response to Russian Defense Minister Sergei 
Ivanov's statement that the arrival of the US special forces training mission in 
Georgia could delay further the withdrawal of Russian military bases from 
Georgian territory. Ivanov also asserted that the US may reconsider its plans to 
deploy the mission. (MAYAK RADIO, 28 Mar 02; BBC, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
Georgia's Foreign Minister Irakly Menagarishvili responded to Ivanov's comments 
in an interview with Vremya Novostei on 1 April: "Russia is currently in gross 
violation of the agreements reached in 1999. Gadauta should have been 
evacuated on 1 July last year. This has not been done. There is no agreement on 
the duration of functioning of the bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki. Under these 
circumstances, the silence of the Russian side can only be interpreted as an 
attempt to draw out and torpedo the process [of military withdrawal]. This might 
be a harsh appraisal, but it is objective." 
 
Chechens get weapons from RF base? 
In a remarkably courageous feat of investigative journalism, reporters from the 
Georgian independent television station Rustavi-2 captured on tape a Georgian 
army colonel, Tristan Tsitelashvili, who incriminated himself in two very fishy 
endeavors. First he elaborated plans to kidnap a Georgian businessman and 
take him to the Pankisi Gorge -- ostensibly to cover a $14,000 debt he owed to 
Chechen militants. He also mentioned serving as a middleman in the arms trade 
between Chechen militants and a Russian unit in South Ossetia. Georgian police 
detained the television crew and the station's offices were shot at on the day 
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following the taping. The arms deal went ahead in South Ossetia on 15 March. 
(RUSTAVI-2, 17 Mar 02; BBC, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Defense minister: No emergency in Pankisi 
During a recent visit to Ukraine, Georgian Defense Minister David Tevzadze 
explained that "not a single incident was logged on the Chechen part of the 
Georgian-Russian border in 2001," and emphasized that "the media exaggerates 
some phenomena [relating to Pankisi]. Thank God, nothing warrants or demands 
an immediate deployment of the army there. Like any other state, Georgia is 
determined to restore order everywhere on its territory. Not only in the Pankisi 
Gorge but also in Abkhazia and South Ossetia." (ZERKALO NEDELI, 23 Feb-1 
Mar 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Tevzadze dismissed the possibility of UN or NATO peacekeepers in Abkhazia, 
saying that it would be preferable to create a truly international force under the 
aegis of the CIS, which would include a sizeable Ukrainian contingent. As 
regards NATO membership, he commented that Georgians are "psychologically" 
ready but will require some years to bring their economy and their military up to 
par with their ambitions and aspirations. 
 
CHECHNYA 
RNU trains recruits for Chechnya combat 
A defector from Russia's 21st Airborne Brigade, Capt. Andrei Samorodov, told 
The New York Times about his experiences on 17 March. He recounted that his 
unit contained ultranationalist recruits who wore fascist insignia on their uniforms. 
He also told of roadside executions of Chechen civilians, and the existence of hit 
squads (he said members of one such unit showed up at his home in Stavropol). 
 
Since a great deal of evidence of Russian brutality already has surfaced, that 
aspect of his account is not the most interesting. Rather, the emphasis on the 
prevalence of a fascist party among the young recruits is the element that is the 
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most worrisome and little studied. Capt. Samodov's description of atrocities 
contradicts the prevailing stereotype -- that hardened spetznaz carry out 
atrocities while young recruits suffer at the hands of Chechen militants. In this 
account, atrocities are carried out by young recruits who are seized by a 
virulently racist ideology. His recruits had undergone training in the fascist 
Russian National Unity party and wore RNU insignia (the swastika) on their 
uniforms. More than any other testimony to date, this account raises concerns 
about official tolerance for fascism in Russia's armed forces. 
 
At the same time, Capt. Samorodov is hardly the first officer to come forth with 
first-hand testimony of savagery in the Russian armed forces. A much longer and 
more thorough exposé was published on 17 September 2000 by Maura Reynolds 
in the Los Angeles Times. She provided excerpts of interviews with many 
Russian soldiers and officers who described in detail the atrocities they 
committed (including quartering a Chechen woman) and explained that this 
behavior had been encouraged by their superiors. 
 
but MVD professionals won't go 
Moreover, Samorodov is hardly the only officer refusing to serve in Chechnya. In 
the past six weeks, special police units in Kaliningrad, Syktyvkar, Vorkuta, 
Vologda, Kirov and Murmansk have protested against serving in Chechnya, in 
what The Guardian on 28 March described as a "spreading mutiny." The article 
highlights an MVD rapid reaction force in Cherepovets that has sent the 
authorities an ultimatum categorically refusing to become "cannon fodder in 
Chechnya." 
 
In the same article the authoritative military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer 
commented that "This sort of thing is happening all the time, though it's seldom 
reported. It's all risk and little pay. Officers are resigning rather than go to 
Chechnya." 
 
 28 
Spy vs. spy 
The commander-in-chief of Russia's interior ministry troops, Vyacheslav 
Tikhomirov, made public the results of his ministry's investigation into the loss of 
the Mi-8 helicopter in Chechnya on 27 January. 
 
"Experts have found that the helicopter was downed by a surface-to-air rocket," 
indicating that it was shot down by the Chechen resistance, Tikhomirov told 
ITAR-TASS on 23 March. The search for the attackers is underway. "It is a 
matter of honor for us and the case will be closed only when the attackers have 
been found," Tikhomirov said. (ITAR-TASS, 23 Mar 02; via lexis-nexis ) 
 
The crash killed 14 persons -- 11 MVD officers (including the deputy interior 
minister, chief of the department for the Southern Federal District Mikhail 
Rudchenko and Interior Ministry Troops Deputy Commander-in-Chief Nikolai 
Garidov), and three crew members. 
 
Tikhomirov's statement contradicts the earlier reports from the FSB that the 
helicopter crash was due to mechanical failure. It remains unexplained what 
factors account for the discrepancy between the FSB assessment and the MVD 
report. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 13 Feb 02) Tikhomirov also announced deep 
cuts into MVD manpower. According to present projections by 2005, the number 
of Russian interior ministry troops will be reduced by 37,400 persons. 
 
In another helicopter story, Anna Politkovskaya, an award-winning journalist with 
Novaya gazeta, reiterated her contention that Russia's own forces shot down a 
helicopter with eight General Staff officers on board over the center of Grozny on 
17 September 2001. The critical events of that day were recounted by The 
Guardian newspaper on 16 March: 
 
"A young Russian general () Anatoly Pozdnyakov, confided in Politkovskaya that 
he was that day returning to Moscow with a report he had written on corruption in 
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Chechnya. He was the head of a new military investigative commission, acting, 
he said, on the personal orders of Putin. An hour after the interview, the general 
was dead. His helicopter, and his top secret report, were shot out of the sky by a 
Stinger missile directly over the city centre -- which was unusually empty, thanks 
to the military at the checkpoints. 'The official version,' says Politkovskaya, 'is that 
a Chechen fighter ran out on to the street, launched the missile and ran away. It 
could not have happened like that. He would have been shot the moment he 
popped his head out.' Ten days after writing that it was, in fact, colonels in 
Chechnya who had shot down their own chief of staff, Politkovskaya, under 
threat of her life, was forced to flee the country." 
 
The report does not specify to which service the "colonels" belong. 
  
Atrocities spark protests 
On 13 March, several hundred residents of the Starye Atagi village held a rally in 
Grozny. They demanded an investigation and punishment of those guilty of 
crimes against civilians committed in the village during a cleansing operation 
("zachistky") in early March. The Starye Atagi residents brought with them the 
burned bodies of seven local residents killed by federal soldiers. 
 
According to Russian representatives, the bodies were of Chechen fighters. A 
representative of the operative headquarters of the counter-terrorist operation, 
Ilya Shabalkin, called the rally an "ordered action, paid for by the opponents of 
peace settlement in Chechnya." Similarly, FSB spokesman Alexander Zdanovich 
called the event a "planned provocation against the federal forces." 
(INOSTRANETS, 19 Mar 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
At a press conference on the same day, Memorial activists presented evidence 
and testimony about ongoing war crimes in Chechnya. Representatives of 
Memorial, Alexander Cherkassov and Oleg Orlov, said that during the operation 
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in Starye Atagi a week earlier, 15 persons were detained. One of them was a 
militant, another was released, another was found dead -- 12 remain missing. 
 
Photographs of disfigured Chechens from another town, Argun, were shown. All 
bodies had wire marks on their wrists that prove that they had been tied up for 
the last hours of their lives and could not have been killed while fighting. 
 
According to Memorial, the number of "missing" in Chechnya is 2,000. To give 
this figure scale, Cherkassov reasoned, "The population of Chechnya is about 
600,000 at present. If the same proportion of people disappeared in Moscow, 
then the number of disappeared people would have run into tens of thousands. 
And this is commensurate with the Great Purge of 1937-1938." (PRESS 
CONFERENCE WITH MEMORIAL REPRESENTATIVES, 13 Mar 02; Federal 
News Service, via lexis-nexis) 
 
Cherkassov also described the operation of "death squads" that "exist in the 
center in Khankala. This is borne out by quite a number of burial sites found near 
Khankala or in Khankala, burial sites for people who were variously detained in 
different places in Chechnya. " According to Cherkassov, although it cannot be 
confirmed, it is highly probable that some members of GRU are involved in such 
units. "Obviously, such structures exist in some districts, for example, the Urus-
Martan district is famous for kidnappings of people at night and torture and then 
their bodies are discovered. (...) We are sure that [this is not the work of] 
militants. (...) [I]n Urus-Martan militants don't drive around during curfew on army 
vehicles and trucks. Obviously, these are representatives of federal structures. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Michael Donahue 
 
TURKMENISTAN 
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Problem area 
 
The United States finds itself in an awkward situation in Central Asia -- whether 
to deal with regimes for immediate objectives in the "war on terrorism." 
Turkmenistan's eccentric President Saparmurat "Turkmenbashi" Niyazov has 
been linked to the trafficking of illegal narcotics. According to a variety of well-
placed sources, Niyazov has been involved actively in the trafficking of heroin 
(predominantly) at least since 1997. In fact, the UN reports that nearly 50% of all 
drugs consumed in Western Europe are trafficked through Central Asia, and as 
Niyazov is reported to transship between 80 to 120 tons annually, he certainly 
appears to be the region's most high-ranking drug middleman. (EURASIA 
INSIGHT, 29 Mar 02; via Eurasianet) What may be most troubling about the 
possibilities of Niyazov's connection to the drug trade is that it comes at a time 
when the United States is shopping around for a state in which to anchor its 
regional influence for a longer term. 
 
While Niyazov thus far has been of little obvious help to America in the "war on 
terrorism," he possesses much that the United States desires in a future friend, 
namely oil and a strategic location. He could have used both to his advantage in 
inking a deal with Washington; instead he ignored obvious opportunities and may 
have sealed his fate. Like other authoritarian regimes in Central Asia, Niyazov's 
Turkmenistan is both oppressive and paranoid. Opposition groups often operate 
in secrecy and are routinely imprisoned or otherwise eliminated. Now, however, 
they may have an opportunity to isolate Niyazov internationally and, ultimately, 
force his resignation. The United States is certainly eager to participate in a free 
market competition for Turkmenistan's share of Central Asia's energy reserves, 
and cannot fail to appreciate that the country shares an expansive border with 
"Axis of Evil" member Iran. 
 
While Turkmenbashi himself has been cool to the Bush Administration's 
advances, savvy opposition leaders such as Boris Shikhmuradov must realize 
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that they are faced now with opportunities. These groups could appeal to 
Washington for financial aid and significant increases in diplomatic pressure on 
Niyazov to resign in exchange for closer relations, and possible basing rights 
within Turkmenistan. Washington, for its part, needs to understand that the 
window of opportunity cannot remain open forever. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Michael Varuolo 
 
Domestic political issues threaten to jump across borders 
The political forces within the Baltic states are beginning to realign with the self-
assertion of opposition groupings that in the future may produce a political force 
capable of threatening the status quo within two of these republics. Within 
Estonia, the two largest Russian political parties have agreed to terms that would 
enable them to unify their constituencies in a coalition umbrella for autumn local 
elections. (BNS, 1553 GMT, 25 Mar 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0325, via World News 
Connection) Initially this move by the Estonian Unity Party and the United 
People's Party is unlikely to bring about major change within the country's 
political landscape, but as more and more members of the Russian minority 
obtain citizenship the coalition could present a new power nucleus within the 
state. 
 
Meanwhile, in Latvia, the new center-left party calling itself the Social Democratic 
Union (SDS) has moved into the political spotlight as it strives to portray itself as 
the true champion of the Latvian people and their ideals. (BNS, 0801 GMT, 25 
Mar 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0325, via World News Connection) The events in Latvia 
are particularly troublesome as they occur at a time when domestic concerns are 
being elevated to the international scene through the OSCE, Russia and Latvia 
itself. Recently, Latvia revoked the license of the Russian-language Biznes un 
Baltija (BB) radio station when it determined that the station had violated 
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copyright and other media laws. (BNS, 1604 GMT, 18 Mar 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
0318, via World News Connection) The move, in accordance with Latvian 
Supreme Court ruling, effectively closed the country's most popular radio station. 
As could be expected, this event triggered a strong response from Russia. The 
international community subsequently weighed in, with comments from the 
OSCE as well as Swedish and US officials, concerning the use of the Russian 
language in Latvia. In Lithuania, another minority political party, the Electoral 
Action of Lithuanian Poles, is solidifying its position. Sparked by what it sees as 
attacks on its language and culture within the minority language schools, the 
party organized protests and demonstrations. (BNS, 1524 GMT, 13 Mar 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-0313, via World News Connection) 
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